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THE SURVIVAL OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE: HOW DO WE STOP
RANSOMWARE ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS?
Helena Roland*

In March 2018, a ransomware attack struck hospitals in Georgia, holding
3,789 computers hostage for ten days.1 In September 2019, a ransomware attack
cancelled numerous surgeries in Wyoming.2 Since 2019, there have been 621
ransomware attacks on hospitals across the globe.3 Malicious software has
silently struck the nation’s healthcare system at a dramatic pace, and there is no
clear way to stop it. A place in which humanity seeks help and recovery is under
attack and the attackers are not held accountable in a court of law.
Hospitals are a critical component of the nation’s social infrastructure.4 Take
a moment: is it possible to name a person that has not sought out medical
treatment? Additionally, is there a time when a patient walks into a medical
facility and is able to withhold all personal information and data? The healthcare
industry is rapidly growing, as necessary, to meet all needs. However, as the
industry grows, so does the opportunity to strike.5 Hospitals have access to social
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Vanessa Romo, Georgia Charges Iranians in Ransomware Attack on Atlanta, NPR (Dec.
5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/05/673958138/georgia-charges-iranians-inransomware-attack-on-atlanta.
2
Aimee Picchi, Ransomware’s Mounting Toll: Delayed Surgeries and School
Closures, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ransomware-attack621-hospitals-cities-and-schools-hit-so-far-in-2019/.
3
Picchi, supra note 2.
4
See Ryan Nunn et al., A Dozen Facts About the Economics of the US Health-Care
System, BROOKINGS (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-dozen-factsabout-the-economics-of-the-u-s-health-care-system/ (noting that the United States relies
heavily on hospitals for employment and economic infrastructure).
5
See generally Sylvestre Uwizeyemungu & Placide Poba-Nzaou, Security and Privacy
1
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security numbers, bank account information, health records, familial
background information, genetic information, and almost everything one would
want to remain private in one’s life.6 Every time a patient walks into a doctor’s
office she must either fill out a form that has all personal data or she must check
over that sheet to ensure that the data is correct. What would happen if
unscrupulous individuals stole that information and held it for ransom?
This article will begin with the origins of ransomware attacks in 1989.7 Then,
it will discuss the definition of ransomware and how the tactic has been viewed
in the modern world.8 After defining the term, the article will turn to the
reasoning behind hospital ransomware attacks and why a critical feature of the
nation’s infrastructure is under attack.9 Consequently, there are practical and
legal ramifications of ransomware attacks that must be addressed.10 Finally, this
article will look at how ransomware attacks can be deterred through the
American legal system, such as the adoption of a criminal theory of general

Practice in Healthcare Information Systems: A Cluster Analysis of European Hospitals, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYS. SEC. AND PRIVACY 1, 41–44 (2016)
(showing that as a hospital’s reliance on technology increases, the need for secure IT
protection increases).
6
See Patient Registration Forms, DOCTORS CARE, https://doctorscare.com/
patientforms/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2021); see also New Patient Information and Consent,
DOCTORS CARE, https://doctorscare.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/PAT-F002A-11-19DC-Patient-Information-and-Consent-New-Patient.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) (providing
an example of the type of information that healthcare providers require from patients,
including birthdate, social security number, address, and employer).
7
Kaveh Waddell, The Computer Virus That Haunted Early AIDS Researchers: The
First-Ever Ransomware Attack Was Delivered on a Floppy Disk, THE ATLANTIC (May 10,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/the-computer-virus-thathaunted-early-aids-researchers/481965/.
8
Ransomware, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.uscert.gov/Ransomware (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
9
Deborah R. Farringer, Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die: Addressing the Risks
of Ransomware Attacks on Hospitals, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 941 (2017); Hackers
Demand $14 Million from Nursing Homes in Ransomware Attack, CBS NEWS (Nov. 25,
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hackers-ransomware-nursing-homes-14-million/.
10 See Manny Fernandez et al., Ransomware Attacks are Testing Resolve of Cities
Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/
us/ransomware-attacks-hacking.html; see also Michael Balsamo, 2 Iranian Hackers
Charged in Ransomware Scheme that Targeted Maryland’s MedStar Health, BALT. SUN
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-medstar-ransomwareindictment-20181129-story.html; see also Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals
for City of Atlanta Ransomware Attack, U.S. ATT’Y OFF., N.D. OF GA. (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/atlanta-us-attorney-charges-iranian-nationals-cityatlanta-ransomware-attack.
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deterrence,11 creation of an American tribunal for cybercrime,12 an
implementation of cybercrime laws at local levels,13 and an increase in federal
funding.14 This article will make it apparent that there is more the United States
can do to prevent ransomware attacks.
I. ORIGINS OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS
In 1989, the AIDS epidemic was at an all-time high: over 100,000 reported
cases.15 In the same year, the first major ransomware threat emerged entitled
“AIDS Trojan.”16 An evolutionary biologist, Joseph Popp, created a computerbased questionnaire that helped patients determine the risk they had of
contracting AIDS.17 A disc was sent via mail entitled “AIDS Information
Introductory Diskette,” disguised as legitimate software on the AIDS epidemic
to deceive recipients;18 approximately 20,000 copies were distributed to 90
different countries.19 After inserting the disc, nothing appeared different;
however, ninety reboots later, the ransomware within the disc-delivered
encrypted files, compromising the user’s computer.20 Victims’ computers were
frozen and could not be unlocked without a “licensing fee” paid to the hacker,
which rendered most computers unusable.21 The fee had to be paid either
through a cashier’s check or international money order.22 Fortunately,
researchers produced “antidotes” to record all files that were locked on victims’
11 Robert Staal, International Conflict of Laws — The Protective Principle in
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 428 (1961); Mark A.
Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RES. 263,
264–82 (2003); Isak Ladegaard, We Know Where You Are, What You Are Doing and We
Will Catch You: Testing Deterrence Theory in Digital Drug Markets, 58 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL.,
414, 415 (2017).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Transnational Cyber
Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional Challenges, 43 YALE J. INTL. L. 191, 223–26 (2018)
(“The availability of an international criminal tribunal . . . would medicated many of the
problems of State jurisdiction . . .”).
13 Alan Neuhauser, Can the Law Stop Ransomware?, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 13, 2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2018-04-13/can-the-law-stopransomware.
14 Maggie Miller, Lawmakers Criticize Trump’s Slashed Budget for Key Federal Cyber
Agenda, THE HILL (Mar. 11, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/487120lawmakers-criticize-trumps-slashed-budget-for-key-federal-cyber-agency.
15 Waddell, supra note 7.
16 Alexandre Gazet, Comparative Analysis of Various Ransomware Virii, 6 J. COMP.
VIROL. 77, 78 (2010).
17 Waddell, supra note 7.
18 Gazet, supra note 16.
19 Waddell, supra note 7.
20 Gazet, supra note 16.
21 Waddell, supra note 7.
22 Id.
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computers.23 After Popp was arrested, it was discovered that the ransomware
attack was a reaction to not being hired by the World Health Organization.24
Popp was angry he was overlooked for a promotion and launched an attack on
almost 100,000 people across the globe.25 Ever since, the trend of ransomware
attacks has been on the rise, with different motives behind each attack.26
II. WHAT IS RANSOMWARE?
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), an agency
within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), defines “ransomware”
as a type of malicious software (“malware”) that is designed to restrict or deny
access to computer data until a ransom, typically in the form of bitcoin, is fully
paid by the victim(s).27 More commonly, the definition of “ransomware” is
malware that locks an individual’s or company’s computer, or the overall
computer system, and prevents the individual or company from accessing the
data until the affected party pays a ransom, usually in bitcoin.28 Bitcoin is a
method of “electronic cash” that is maintained through transactions with other
users.29 The malware enters the computer through three distinct methods: (1)
through phishing emails, which is an email used by scammers to trick the
receiving party into giving up personal information;30 (2) through phishing
emails that are sent from a company a party may know in an attempt to get the
reader to click a link which releases the malware;31 or (3) through “infected”
websites that humans unknowingly visit.32 Ransomware occurs in three phases:
(1) seeking a target, (2) extortion and loss of access, and (3) ransom message
display.33 In the first phase, attackers target documents as it is quicker and more
efficient to access information, and they eventually gain power over his or her
Id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. (noting that ransomware today is used to target incompetent technology users
by convincing them something is horribly with their computers that can be fixed for a small
sum, as well as to target hospitals with advanced encryption technology for ransoms as high
as $17,000).
27 Ransomware, supra note 8.
28 Farringer, supra note 9, at 953.
29 What Is Bitcoin?, BITCOIN MAG., https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-bitcoin
(last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
30 How to Recognize and Avoid Phishing Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.
consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-and-avoid-phishing-scams (last visited Mar. 4,
2021).
31 Id.
32 Ransomware, supra note 8.
33 Gazet, supra note 16, at 77–78.
23
24
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victim(s) through freezing and extorting data.34 Finally, the attacker reaches the
ultimate goal of gaining money from the victim(s).35
Studies have found that hackers “exploit cyber weaknesses and gain access
into victims’ computers” to install the ransomware software remotely, then
encrypt the files, freeze their entire computer, and demand payment in ransom
to have the data unlocked.36
III. WHAT ARE HOSPITAL RANSOMWARE ATTACKS?
Ransomware attacks on hospitals are on the rise as hospitals are becoming
uniquely vulnerable in the new digital age.37 This vulnerability stems from (1)
glacial-slow movement toward electronic medical records; (2) the Department
of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) lack of enforcement of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”), and the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinic Health Act (“HITCH”) “with
respect to security of electronic data;”38 and (3) the sheer necessity of paying
hackers for electronic data.39
First, massive computer systems are needed to transfer all medical data that
was once recorded on paper to an electronic system, which opens a door for
attackers to infiltrate the process of transferring data.40 Expensive machinery is
needed to sustain these massive electronic systems, which cost the hospital
thousands if not millions of dollars. Thus, hospital executives are wary to spend
even more money on security.41 From stealing hospital-issued laptops or cell
phones, to infiltrating large-scale HIPPA breaches, the sheer size of hospitals
makes them accessible targets for attacks.42 Furthermore, human error is a
massive risk when it comes to ransomware attacks, and hospitals employ one of
the largest networks of employees in the working world, from doctors to nurses
to administrative staff.43
There is an immense financial incentive to attack hospitals because the

Id.
Id. at 78.
36 Balsamo, supra note 10.
37 Farringer, supra note 9, at 940–41.
38 Id. at 941.
39 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9.
40 Farringer, supra note 9, at 956–57 (outlining generally the large-scale investments in
IT security by many health institutions required to defend against ransomware attacks).
41 Id. at 956–57 (outlining criticisms of the current IT security practices of many
hospitals).
42 See id. at 951 (noting that more recent data breaches have seen smaller breaches
morph “into larger-scale HIPAA breaches, such as hackers infiltrating the networks of large
health systems and insurers).
43 Id. at 957.
34
35
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attacker can demand more money due to the sensitive data and functionalities
that live within hospital computers.44 Mike Christman, a section chief for the
cyber division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), stated that
“cybercrooks” know that hospitals “are more likely to pay if only because they
can’t afford not to.”45 The average digital extortion payout in 2018 was
approximately $36,295.46 Hospitals hit with ransomware attacks face the
dilemma of paying the attacker in an attempt to get private data back or refusing
to pay and risk losing all data.47 Consequently, hospitals are more likely to pay
the ransom than attempt to recover the stolen data through other software
means.48
The two specific types of ransomware that are used to attack hospitals are the
“Locky virus” and “Samas virus.”49 The Locky virus begins its attack on
hospitals through emails that are opened by unknowing individuals in the
hospital.50 Next, the malware that has been unknowingly installed by the hospital
employee moves through the system.51 As a result, the malware locks out all
users until access is granted by the attackers and once they have received the
bitcoin payment.52 On the other hand, the Samas virus attacks through
“vulnerabilities in web servers.”53 One example of a common web server
vulnerability is called an “SQL injection” where the attacker can gain access to
a computer’s database and even “spoof a user’s identity,” leading to the
destruction or alteration of data within the database.54
IV. PREVIOUS RANSOMWARE ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS AND
MEDICAL FACILITIES
In September 2019, Campbell County Health in Wyoming was subject to a

44 See id. at 952 (noting the primarily financial motivations of many recent ransomware
attacks on hospitals, as personal information can be sold as “hacked” data on the black
market).
45 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9.
46 Picchi, supra note 2.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Farringer, supra note 9, at 955.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Emily Pribanic, Web Server Vulnerabilities Attacks: How to Protect Your
Organization, TECH FUNNEL (last updated June 29, 2020), https://www.techfunnel.com/
information-technology/web-server-vulnerabilities-attacks-how-to-protect-yourorganization/.
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ransomware attack, which held all computers hostage.55 As a result, surgeries
were cancelled, laboratories and therapies were halted, the hospital would not
take on new patients, and local community members were forced to travel to
other hospitals.56 Typically, smaller cities are more attractive targets for
attackers because they lack resources to fight the attack and the money is coming
from taxpayer dollars.57
On October 1, 2019, DCH Health System in Alabama had to close three
separate hospitals to new patients because they were under ransomware
attacks.58 The hacker sent an email about the ransom information, alerting
hospital staff of the impending attack.59 The health network’s computer systems
were “paralyzed,” and medical staff were forced to turn away “all but the most
critical new patients.”60As a result, ambulances were instructed to cease their
usual activities—patrolling the streets to ensure proximity to potential health
crises—to transfer all patients to other hospitals, thereby threatening the lives of
patients who have to travel farther for healthcare.61
On September 30, 2019, seven Australian hospitals responded to a “cyber
health incident.”62 A ransomware attack blocked access to several systems,
including their financial management networks.63 Consequently, hospital
computer systems were locked for the first twenty-four hours after the attack.64
Australian authorities stated that it would take weeks to secure and restore the
damaged networks.65
On November 17, 2019, Virtual Care Provider, a company that provides
technology to over one hundred nursing homes in the U.S., fell victim to a
ransomware attack.66 The hackers demanded fourteen million dollars before they
would restore access to the company’s servers.67 The company was unable to
pay the demand; consequently, many of the nursing homes that relied on the
company were unable to access patient records, use the internet, order
Picchi, supra note 2.
Id.
57 Id.
58 Dan Goodin, Ransomware Forces 3 Hospitals to Turn Away All but the Most Critical
Patients, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 1, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/
2019/10/hamstrung-by-ransomware-10-hospitals-are-turning-away-some-patients/.
59 James Franklin, DCH Health Systems Hit by Ransomware Attack, Not Taking
Patients, ABC 33/40 (Oct. 1, 2019), https://abc3340.com/news/local/dch-hospitals-hit-byransomware-attack-not-taking-patients.
60 Goodin, supra note 58.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9.
67 Id.
55
56
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medication, or pay their employees.68 A day after the attack, the company
learned that twenty percent of its services were affected and one hundred servers
needed to be rebuilt.69 After further investigation by a local security firm, it was
determined that Russian hackers infected the company’s computers over a
fourteen-month timeframe using malicious email attachments.70
A. MedStar Health Attack – March 28, 2016, Maryland
On March 28, 2016, one of the most extensive ransomware attacks happened
in Washington, D.C.71 Employees at MedStar Health began to see pop-up
messages on computer screens that were seeking payment in bitcoin for hijacked
data: $19,000 in exchange for a digital key that would release all data.72 All
systems remained dark over a ten-day holdout period: ten hospitals and 250
outpatient centers had to shut down all computers.73 Patients were either turned
away or treated without proper computer records.74
Over 30,000 employees were forced to use old paper records to treat incoming
and current patients, which led to a dangerous patient safety issue.75 For
example, the attack led to lab results taking much longer than usual, and it caused
a nurse to accidentally continue a patient’s powerful antibiotic treatment for
eight hours longer than necessary.76 Additionally, appointments were cancelled
for non-life-threatening health issues, such as quarterly visits with kidney
specialists and weekly radiation treatment.77 The encrypted hospital data caused
staff and patients “to report delays in service and confusion in treatment.”78
This attack was, unfortunately, successful because of the specific tactics
employed by the hackers. First, the hospitals were targeted after normal business
hours, so there were few members on hand to respond to the immediate attack.79
Second, the hackers used European-based services to launch the attacks on the

Id.
Id.
70 Id.
71 John Woodrow Cox, MedStar Health Turns Away Patients After Likely Ransomware
Cyberattack, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/medstarhealth-turns-away-patients-one-day-after-cyberattack-on-its-computers/2016/03/29/
252626ae-f5bc-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Balsamo, supra note 10.
79 Id.
68
69
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hospitals from a remote location, which would later be determined as Iran.80
V. CONSEQUENCES OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS
After the MedStar ransomware attack, the FBI and US Secret Service tracked
the hackers to Iranian computers.81 These hackers were found to have been at
the helm of schemes targeting government agencies, small cities, and local
businesses in the US.82 In addition to targeting MedStar Health, these hackers
attacked the cities of Atlanta, Georgia, and Newark, New Jersey; they attacked
the Colorado Department of Transportation, the San Ysidro Port in San Diego,
and five other healthcare companies in the US.83 Overall, these hackers amassed
almost $6 million, while their victims suffered more than $30 million in losses.84
The attack encrypted data from computers of more than 200 victims.85 The
attackers used “SamSam” ransomware,86 a form of the Samas virus,87 to attack
each of the victims.88 The financial recovery can cost upwards of millions of
dollars, potentially running many smaller cities and governments into
bankruptcy.89 As a result of this vicious malware, “cyberinsurance” has been on
the rise: an insurer will now pay the requested ransom to help limit the
catastrophic results that stem from losing data.90
Cyber insurance is offered to organizations that use computer systems in their
businesses.91 This form of insurance can benefit the organization when it is
facing a lawsuit from owners of data that has either been “lost or compromised
by a hacker” from the organization’s computer system.92 Cyber insurance
“covers financial losses that result from data breaches and other cyber events.”93
When it comes to “cyber extortion,” also known as ransomware, cyber insurance

Id.
Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10.
82 Balsamo, supra note 10.
83 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10; Balsamo, supra note 10.
84 Balsamo, supra note 10.
85 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10.
86 Balsamo, supra note 10.
87 Farringer, supra note 9, at 955.
88 Balsamo, supra note 10.
89 See Fernandez et al., supra note 10.
90 Id.
91 Marianne Bonner, What Does a Cyber Liability Policy Cover?, BALANCE SMALL BUS.
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-s-covered-under-a-cyber-liabilitypolicy-462459.
92 Id.
93 Id.
80
81
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typically extends to “any extortion payment” or expenses incurred in responding
to the demand of the extorter.94 According to Raytheon, an aerospace and
defense company,95 “97% of networks will experience a security compromise
over any given six-month period;” therefore, cyber insurance is necessary to
protect a company from vulnerability.96 The cost of cyber insurance varies based
on the size of the company, annual revenue, and the industry, but typical
premiums can incur an annual cost of anywhere from $650 to $120,000.97
However, regardless of the growing cyber insurance industry, the ransomware
business is so lucrative that hackers are putting profits made from the ransom
into research on how to execute ransomware attacks more fluidly.98 For
example, in May 2017, the city of Baltimore was attacked by ransomware with
the hacker’s ultimate goal of $76,000 in bitcoin, or else the hacker would not
release the city’s files.99 The city refused, and the resulting damage cost more
than the original ransom: $5.3 million was spent on computers and contractors
to recover the lost information; lost revenue and expenditures cost more than
$18 million; and many of the city’s residents faced water bills more than three
times the normal amount.100
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS
As a result of this vicious malware, the FBI, US Secret Service,101 National
Security Agency (“NSA”), and other intelligence bodies have become
increasingly involved in ransomware attacks.102 Recent attackers have been both
American-born as well as foreign nationals from Eastern Europe and Iran.103
Craig Carpentino, the US Attorney for New Jersey, stated that not only were
these attackers installing ransomware for money, but they were also “seeking to
harm our institutions and our critical infrastructure.”104
On a state level, states governments from California, Connecticut, Michigan,
94
95

Id.
What We Do, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities (last visited Mar. 4,

2021).
96 Brand Barney, Cyber Breach Insurance: How Much Does It Cost?
SECURITYMETRICS, https://www.securitymetrics.com/blog/cyber-breach-insurance-howmuch-does-it-cost (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
97 Id.
98 Fernandez et al., supra note 10.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10.
102 Fernandez et al., supra note 10.
103 Id.
104 Balsamo, supra note 10.
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Texas, and Wyoming have introduced new laws that specifically target
“‘ransomware’ or computer extortion.”105 For example, Connecticut has a law
that grants prosecutors the power to apply traditional extortion charges, as
necessary, to ransomware attacks. These can result in three years
imprisonment.106
The paramount example is a 2018 pending case in the US state of Georgia
against two Iranian nationals, Faramarz Shahi Savandi and Mohammed Mehdi
Shah Mansouri. The men deployed the attack on MedStar Health in the
Washington, D.C., region and the attack against the city of Atlanta using the
same “SamSam” ransomware.107 The March 2018108 attack focused on city
computer systems and attempted to extort “tens of thousands of dollars” from
the government of Atlanta.109 The attack lasted longer than a week, with an
original demand of $51,000 and 3,789 computers held hostage.110 A federal
grand jury indicted the two men in the US District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.111
Additionally, both men were indicted by a federal grand jury in New Jersey
for six different counts of conspiracy, fraud, and intentional damage.112 The two
District Courts worked in coordination with one another and the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the United States Department of
Justice.113 In December 2015, the two men accessed computers of victims,
hospitals, municipalities, and public institutions, and installed “SamSam”
ransomware to encrypt data on their computers.114 The indictment included
victims across North America, from the cities of Atlanta and Newark to the
University of Calgary in Alberta, Canada.115 The indictment, “the first of its
kind,” outlined “an Iran-based international computer hacking and extortion
scheme that engaged in 21st-century digital blackmail.”116 As promising as both
Fernandez et al., supra note 10.
Id.
107 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10.
108 Id.
109 Romo, supra note 1.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware
Attack, supra note 10.
113 Id.
114 Office of Public Affairs, Two Iranian Men Indicted for Deploying Ransomware to
Extort Hospitals, Municipalities, and Public Institutions, Causing Over $30 Million in
Losses, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-iranianmen-indicted-deploying-ransomware-extort-hospitals-municipalities-and-public.-indicteddeploying-ransomware-extort-hospitals-municipalities-and-public.
115 Id.
116 Id.
105
106
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indictments may sound, legal scholars have been wary to hold out hope for
justice against Savandi and Mansouri: the US does not have an extradition treaty
with Iran, so a trial likely cannot be held if both defendants are hiding abroad.117
However, these indictments are part of a larger strategy of the US government
in an attempt to create “legally admissible cases against foreign cyber
attackers.”118 As of right now, attackers are “unlikely to see the inside of a [US]
courtroom.”119
VII. TRANSNATIONAL CYBERATTACKS – RANSOMWARE
Cyberspace is a term that is difficult to grasp; it has been deemed a space that
“lacks geographic boundaries and does not map neatly onto the traditional
system of territorial jurisdiction.”120 One major problem with cybercrimes is the
issue of transnational cyber offenses and how a state may claim jurisdiction.121
One of the most common types of transnational cyberattacks is infectious
malware, the overarching category that encompasses ransomware.122
With cyberattacks becoming more frequent, the government needs to adjust
its legal system to incorporate civilian and international attackers.123 Currently,
the FBI prosecutes computer crime and the Defense Department (“DoD”)
prosecutes cyberwarfare.124 However, ransomware is a form of computer crime
and, at the same time, cyberwarfare, as it seeks to extort its victims.125 Which
internal agency prosecutes the hackers? Domestic cybercrime laws traditionally
do not extend extraterritorially as it is viewed as a violation of other nations’
sovereignty.126 Which country can prosecute the hackers? American cybercrime
enforcement, especially relating to the healthcare industry, is very limited.127
Therefore, the government must act before taxpayers lose more money, hospitals
shut down, operating rooms go dark, and local governments go bankrupt by
attempting to regain data.
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DISCUSSION

The paramount question facing our legal system is how our government can
get international attackers on US soil to face their day in court for the attacks
they executed against American victims? Cyberattacks on American hospitals
are one of the few non-violent acts that can create a fine line between life and
death; therefore, making a legal statement to ensure hackers do not continue to
infiltrate our healthcare system is of the utmost importance.128 I argue that the
lack of procedural guidelines over how to prosecute ransomware hackers is
putting American lives at risk. The US government needs to implement
measures to specifically target international hospital hackers, or else private data
could have the dangerous potential to go public with no way to stop it.
Before addressing ways to manage this new form of cyberattack, it is
necessary to understand why stopping ransomware in the American healthcare
system is imperative on a global level. Healthcare company data is
extraordinarily valuable. It is a highly sought-after target for attackers: “You can
do anything with a complete electronic health record.”129 Stephen Batchelder,
the Massachusetts Interlocal Insurance Association’s (“MIIA”) Director of
Claims and Risk Management Operations stated, “When critical systems at
hospitals, police and fire departments, or vital infrastructure systems such as
water, electricity, and natural gas are attacked, public safety and individual
welfare can be put at risk.”130 An attack on a healthcare system is ultimately an
attack on America’s critical infrastructure.131 Researchers at Vanderbilt
University’s Graduate School of Management analyzed an HHS list of more
than 3,000 hospitals, about ten percent of which suffered from a data breach.132
The study found that after data breaches, “as many as 36 additional deaths per
10,000 heart attacks occurred annually at the hundreds of hospitals
examined.”133 Additionally, for healthcare centers that experienced a
ransomware attack, it took an additional 2.7 minutes for patients suffering from
a heart attack to receive an electrocardiogram,134 a test used to detect heart

128 Fred Donovan, Defending Against Healthcare Ransomware Attacks, HEALTH IT SEC.
(May 4, 2018), https://healthitsecurity.com/features/defending-against-healthcareransomware-attacks.
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problems.135 Researchers from Vanderbilt also discovered that remediation
efforts after a data breach were associated with a decline in the timeliness of care
and patient outcomes.136 The former Deputy Chief Information Security Officer
at HHS, Leo Scanlon, stated that “the exploitation of cybersecurity
vulnerabilities is killing people.”137 Overall, the study found that “hospitals that
have been hit by a data breach or ransomware attack can expect to see an increase
in death rate among heart patients in the following months or years because of
cybersecurity remediation efforts.”138
A. Measures to be Implemented – International & Domestic Jurisprudence
First and foremost, before implementing any other form of international
jurisprudence toward healthcare ransomware prevention, the US must set forth
a theory of protective extraterritorial jurisdiction over ransomware attacks on
American healthcare systems. The protective theory claims jurisdiction over any
act “predicated on the national interest injured by the offense committed
abroad.”139 This theory, based on self-defense, was designed to protect the
national interest of the injured country through its legal system.140 The hacking
of healthcare systems in the US is a matter of national security, as it is the
nucleus of American infrastructure, which houses almost every single
American’s personal data and effects. Thus, if protective jurisdiction is ensured
through international treaties, agreements, and statements by public officials, US
courts would have the power to hear these cases without question.141
1. Criminal Theory of General Deterrence
A court system is built to ensure accountability of one’s actions:
“accountability is cast as a prerequisite for justice.”142 The main method of
international criminal accountability is jail time.143 Without accountability, our
system would descend into chaos as criminals could escape without
135 Electrocardiogram (ECG or EKG), MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/ekg/about/pac-20384983 (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
136 Krebs, supra note 132.
137 Id.
138 Krebs, supra note 132; Sung J. Choi et al., Data Breach Remediation Efforts and
Their Implications for Hospital Quality, 54 HEALTH SERV. RES. 971 (2019).
139 Staal, supra note 11, at 428.
140 Id. at 429
141 See id. at 428 (recounting a case where the U.S. had jurisdiction over a Mexican
citizen because the crime affected U.S. sovereign territory).
142 Drumbl, supra note 11, at 264.
143 Id.
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repercussions: “without accountability measures, cyberspace risks becoming a
Hobbesian state of nature in which victims engage in self-help and cybervigilantism.”144 A government cannot allow victims to take accountability into
their own hands. There must be legal measures in place to ensure the hackers
will be brought to justice in a court of law. Currently, there are no accountability
measures in place because the field of ransomware attacks is new and law
enforcement officers, coupled with the judiciary, need a system in which to
execute and enforce laws on a cyber-plane.
One measure that could be implemented is a form of international criminal
jurisprudence through general deterrence as to healthcare ransomware. It is a
well-known theory that if general deterrence triumphs, “crises and wars do not
occur.”145 General deterrence addresses the assumption that human beings act
based on what is in their best benefit.146 Relatedly, human beings will aim to
avoid “unpleasant consequences, such as punishment;”147 therefore, if the
punishment becomes more severe, the hacker is less likely to break the law,
resulting in a decreased crime rate.148 The key is “to install a sense of increased
risk of punishment in the individual that is contemplating criminal behavior.”149
Although there is a growing trend that harsher punishment does not lead to an
effective cease of criminal activity,150 prevention coupled with accountability,
in the form of general deterrence, can formulate a targeted international criminal
justice campaign.151
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
Rwanda (“ICTR”) rationalized the punishment of crimes before these courts
under each of the traditional justifications for punishment: retribution,
deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation.152 In many imperative cases, the
tribunals impose sentences with the goal of deterrence to warn future
international leaders that “they will be held accountable for their behavior.”153
As stated above, ransomware in hospitals is some of the most destructive cyberPerloff-Giles, supra note 12, at 192.
Stephen L. Quackenbush, General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing
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warfare to date. As such, it is in the interest of national security to put an end to
it. Therefore, a strict punishment should be applied to perpetrators to deter
copycats and likeminded individuals from attacking the data of US citizens.
2. US Tribunals for Cybercrime
The US government can ensure protection from international cybercrime in
the form of hospital ransomware by the creation of a forum to hear civil cases
stemming from cybercrime hackers.154 During a criminal trial, or even after the
case has ended, civil cases for economic damages allow the victims to receive
some form of compensation. In the case of healthcare ransomware, civil cases
can come from the hospitals attacked, the patients whose data was breached, or
the local government who had to pay for the repercussions. These forums can
take the form of Article I courts.155 The Constitution enables Congress to create
inferior tribunals to hear different matters.156
Precedent has been set for independent tribunals through Dames & Moore v.
Regan.157 In response to the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran and its
US occupants, President Jimmy Carter used the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) to seize all Iranian property in the United
States.158 Consequently, Dames & Moore filed suit against the Government of
Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Iranian banks with allegations
of money owed for services performed for the Atomic Energy Organization.159
As a result, the district court issued orders of attachment against property of the
co-defendants to secure a judgment.160 Iran and the US came to an agreement on
January 19, 1981, known as the Algiers Accords, which freed all US hostages in
exchange for the termination of all legal proceedings against Iran in US courts
and the nullification of judgments against the foreign state.161 Dames & Moore
filed suit against the US seeking to prevent the enforcement of the Accords,
which nullified the claim against the Iranian co-defendants.162
154 See Perloff-Giles, supra note 12, at 209–11 (noting that ensuring accountability and
preventing victims from resorting to “cyber-vigilantism” includes providing a forum for
businesses to bring complaints and seek some kind of relief).
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
156 Id.
157 Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of Treasury, et al., 453 U.S. 654, 654 (1981).
158 Executive Power Under Dames & Moore v Regan, CONST. L. REP.,
https://constitutionallawreporter.com/2019/04/25/dames-moore-v-regan-1981/, (last visited
Mar. 4, 2021).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.

2020]

The Survival of Critical Infrastructure

193

The case went up to the Supreme Court of the United States, which upheld
the constitutionality of the Algiers Accord and the creation of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) in response to the Iranian hostage crisis.163
The IUSCT only hears commercial claims generated by the crisis between US
nationals and Iran.164 The tribunal was created through the use of IEEPA, an act
of Congress, and the Algiers Accord, a treaty that was created by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, making the IUSCT an Article I
court.165
Another example of an Article I tribunal is the United States Tax Court (“Tax
Court”).166 The Tax Court is implicated when the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) determines there is a tax deficiency.167 Additionally,
the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Claims
Court”) is another example of an Article I tribunal.168 The Veterans Claims
Court was established through the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, signed by
President Ronald Reagan, which gave the court “exclusive jurisdiction over
decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.”169 Both courts, like the IUSCT,
are authorized by Article I of the Constitution to hear cases and controversies as
designated by Congress.170
A new cybercrime tribunal, established through Article I, would solely focus
on civil claims from prosecutions against international hackers, thereby
promoting a legal remedy for victims in court.171 These tribunals create a new
avenue through which ransomware hackers can be hauled into US courts: “the
potential for individual victims to aggregate claims and obtain significant
damages awards could meaningfully deter would-be cyber attackers.”172 If
patients of a hospital that suffered from a ransomware attack accumulated all
claims into one class action against the attacker, the resulting measures could be
so severe that future hackers would be deterred from committing similar crimes.
The knowledge of a hacker facing not only criminal penalties of potential jail
time, but also civil penalties amounting to millions of dollars, could potentially
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165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
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stymie future hackers from committing the same crimes.
For example, in the March 2016 MedStar Health ransomware attack,
hundreds of potential patients were turned away because the computer software
was completely frozen.173 These turned-away patients could pursue a class
action suit against the hacker for creating the chaos that led to hospital staff
transferring them to other hospitals. Class action suits are time and cost efficient
for the court system; thus, they are also beneficial to the government.174 Class
actions also have a higher likelihood of financial recovery, thereby if judgment
is rendered against the defendant, he or she will most likely have to pay a large
sum of money to all participants in the suit.175 Therefore, if all victims ban
together to file a claim against their ransomware attacker, the likelihood of a
large financial judgment rendered in their favor is even higher. This assurance
can also create a form of deterrence for future potential hackers.176
In the May 2017 Baltimore City attack, the local government paid over $18
million to restore the data lost by the ransomware attack.177 From the $18
million, $5.3 million went to contractors to help restore lost data.178 New
domestic cybercrime tribunals, in the event of another Baltimore-type situation,
could create an avenue in which Baltimore could seek restitution for the
immense loss rather than leaving the crime unrectified, often resulting in higher
taxes for residents and a loss of profits for the city as a whole.179 The idea that a
local government could bring an international hacker to court to seek restitution
for immense damages to the hospital, its patients, or even the city, as a whole,
could create less chaos and fear if another attack were to happen in the future.
Although Congressional action is needed in order to create a tribunal, the
construction of a forum in which victims of cyberattacks can bring their
attacker(s) to justice is one method in which the US government can pursue legal
avenues of deterrence.180
3. International Tribunals
On an international level, the Security Council (Council) of the United
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Nations (U.N.) has created several tribunals to hear specific categories of cases
and controversies.181 Chapter V of the U.N. Charter gives the Council power.182
This power allows the Council to establish tribunals “to bring justice to victims
of international crimes.”183 The Council created the ICTY, a tribunal responsible
for prosecuting people who committed gross violations of human rights in the
former territory of Yugoslavia.184 Legal precedent for these tribunals established
by the Council came from the trial of Duško Tadić.185 The case addressed the
question of whether the ICTY was legitimately formed through the U.N.
Security Council.186 The court determined that the ICTY was properly formed
and had jurisdiction to hear all cases and controversies within the defined limits
created by the Council.187 This determination further establishes that a
lawmaking body has the power to create and outline the powers of tribunals.
B. Measures to be Implemented – Adopt Cybercrime Law at Local Levels
On a much smaller scope than a reformation of international and domestic
legal practices, local governments must adopt laws and regulations that outlaw
cybercrime.188 Information Security Media Group conducted a survey in 2014
that discovered “at least one security breach that affects fewer than 500
individuals has occurred in 75% of surveyed healthcare organizations.”189
Additionally, “at least one incident affecting more than 500 individuals has been
reported by 21% of surveyed healthcare providers.”190 Another study projected
over four million ransomware variants were detected in only the first quarter of
2015.191 Government Technology described local government cybersecurity as
a “crisis,” with the probability of cyberattacks increasing in 2020.192 The
practice of ransomware is increasing on a global scale, and local governments
181 See UN Documentation: International Law, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIB.,
https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
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Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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must act through legal means to curb the enticing reward that ransomware can
provide.193
At the federal level, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act criminalize illegal online activity, however, there
is limited state law that criminalizes ransomware.194 Almost every state has
implemented computer crime laws and data-breach disclosure laws.195 Only
Connecticut, Texas, Wyoming, Michigan, and California have explicitly made
ransomware a crime.196 Wyoming law makes possession of ransomware,
spyware, adware, keyloggers, and similar types of malware illegal.197 Michigan
law makes it illegal only if the perpetrator possesses ransomware software and
intends to deploy it against another.198 Both laws explicitly demonstrate that a
state must be careful when outlining what makes ransomware illegal.199
Additionally, if the law is defined as sheer possession of ransomware on an
electronic device, victims would be at risk of violation as hackers infect their
devices with ransomware: “if you get hacked, you’re going to be in some form
of possession of [malware.]”200
In 2018, 265 bills or resolutions affiliated with cybersecurity were considered
by thirty-five states, along with D.C. and Puerto Rico.201 The key areas of the
bills include: augmenting government security practices, promoting training on
cybersecurity, and providing funding for cybersecurity programs.202 In 2019, the
amount of states and US territories that have considered cybersecurity bills has
increased to forty-three states and Puerto Rico.203 Close to 300 bills were
considered among the forty-three states and Puerto Rico, with thirty-one
enacting cybersecurity-related legislation.204 The topics are broadening to
include: requiring agencies to train employees on security practices, creating
task forces to combat cybercrimes, and addressing cybersecurity political

Id.
Neuhauser, supra note 13.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See H.B. 5257, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017); Neuhauser, supra note 13.
199 Neuhauser, supra note 13.
200 Id.
201 Cyber Security Legislation 2018, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 8,
2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cybersecurity-legislation-2018.aspx.
202 Id.
203 Cyber Security Legislation 2019, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 10,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cybersecurity-legislation-2019.aspx.
204 Id.
193
194

2020]

The Survival of Critical Infrastructure

197

threats.205
In 2016, the University of Maryland, along with the International City/County
Management Association, conducted a nation-wide survey on local government
cybersecurity.206 Approximately thirty-eight percent of local governments were
found to be reliant on generationally inept technology.207 Additionally, fewer
than half of the local governments surveyed had bought cybersecurity
insurance.208 The FBI has repeatedly stated that a current, leading cyberthreat to
local governments is ransomware.209 For example, Fort Worth, Texas, is subject
to 15,000 cyberattacks daily.210 The responsibility of the cyber protection of
constituents and local infrastructure belongs to “the entire chain of elected and
appointed officials in local government.”211 The government cannot leave the
duty of cybersecurity to the information technology departments of local
businesses and hospitals. Local governments must step in and prevent future
attacks.212 Dr. Allan R. Shark, the executive director of the Public Technology
Institute, emphasized that local governments should outsource all information
technology: “Recent ransomware attacks have brought to light many
deficiencies in digital hygiene . . . [g]iven the growing complexities of planning
and maintaining technology as well as having the right staff, many local
governments might be much better off outsourcing some or all of their IT
operations.”213
Although experts have stated that local governments need to start adopting
policy to combat cyberattacks, there are many challenges that have stymied
efforts.214 Teri Takai, the executive director for the Center for Digital
Government, outlined the challenges for local governments’ cybersecurity
efforts: lack of resources, antiquated technology, introduction of new
technology, scope of local government, lack of funding in executive roles, and
lack of understanding of cybersecurity issues.215
When it comes to critical state interests, such as elections, transportation, and
intelligence, municipalities tend to collaborate with one another—sometimes
across state lines—and with the federal government.216 Thus, the practice of
obtaining cybersecurity policy and adopting cybersecurity legislation should fall
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id.
Batchelder, supra note 130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lohrmann, supra note 192.
Id.
Id.
Batchelder, supra note 130.

198

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 29.1

into the same critical state interest categories as elections, transportation, and
intelligence.217
1. Preparation is Not Key
Many experts state that the most diligent approach to defeating ransomware
is to prepare those who could be attacked.218 Experts believe that the best
approach to combat ransomware attacks is through preparation: “. . . following
best practices such as regularly backing up data, educating employees about
threats and risks and maintaining robust firewalls.”219 However, this approach
has not worked since ransomware’s creation in 1989; it is thirty years later and
there has still been an increase in attacks since the original “AIDS Trojan”
attack.220 Attacks have continued to occur across the globe with hospitals, cities,
and states unable or unwilling to upgrade all computer systems to “seal off
vulnerabilities.”221 Preparation can help members know what to look for,222 but
the consequence stemming from robust prosecution is necessary to put a stop to
the catastrophic malware attacks.
C. Measures to be Implements – Increase Funding for Cybercrime Prevention
CISA, the cybersecurity agency of the DHS, is dedicated to defending federal
networks, election infrastructure, and physical security.223 For Fiscal Year 2020,
the House Appropriations Committee approved a $63.8 billion spending
package for the DHS, with specifically two billion earmarked for CISA.224
CISA’s budget increased by $335 million from Fiscal Year 2019.225
Representative Lucille Roybal Allard (D-CA) stated that the twenty-percent
increase in funding will help CISA improve cyber and infrastructure defense
systems faster.226 Notably, CISA gained bipartisan support for increasing its
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budget.227 However, then-Director of CISA, Chris Krebs, requested $3.17
billion when testifying before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation for Fiscal Year 2020.228 Krebs also
requested $371 million for proactive cyber protection, providing CISA’s
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (“NCCIC”)
increased funding to quickly respond to incidents and risks.229
For Fiscal Year 2021, CISA has been approved for only $1.7 billion: “a
significant budget cut from the more than two billion the agency received from
Congress in December 2019.”230 While testifying before the House Homeland
Security Committee, acting Secretary of the DHS, Chad Wolf, attempted to
mitigate the congressional dismay regarding the funding decrease by hinting that
it is possible for the CISA budget to be further decreased in 2021 since it is not
an election year.231 Although the CISA workforce grew by 500,232 its budget
dwindled by $258 million.233 Representative Gary Peters (D-MI) claimed that
state governments are not fiscally prepared to defend their constituents from
attacks, stating: “State and local governments don’t always have the tools to
defend against cyberattacks. Financial constraints, workforce challenges, and
outdated equipment are all serious challenges for states and cities.”234
Representative Cedric Richmond (D-LA) said a “cut of that magnitude” would
harm American communities, and constituents would not be able to defend
themselves against devastating cyberattacks.235 As recognized by members of
Congress, cuts to CISA’s budget are detrimental to national security; all
resources must be used to better handle emerging threats.236
1. COVID-19 Pandemic – The Need for More Funding
On December 31, 2019, scientists detected a new virus “in the city of Wuhan
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in Hubei province, China”237 and subsequently reported to the World Health
Organization (“WHO”).238 On January 30, 2020, the outbreak was declared a
“Public Health Emergency of International Concern.”239 Subsequently, on
February 11, 2020, WHO announced that the name of the new disease is
COVID-19.240 COVID-19, also known as the coronavirus disease, has swept the
entire globe, and has increased the overall demand for “medicine, vaccines,
diagnostics, and reagents.”241 As a result of the growing pandemic, people have
turned to the internet to stay updated, which has created a “perfect opportunity
for hackers.”242 Malicious individuals have capitalized on the growing pandemic
to “exploit and take advantage of the public and business[es].”243
An Android app called “COVID19 Tracker” portrayed itself as an app
tracking the current outbreak. However, it was actually a form of ransomware
locking owners out of their phones.244 After the attacker locked the victim’s
phone, the attacker required that $100 in bitcoin be paid within forty-eight hours
in exchange for the victim to regain control of the phone and its contents.245
Cybersecurity researchers found multiple fake COVID-19 tracker maps that can
infect computers, in addition to the apps that can infect phones.246
COVID-19 has created a stage for ransomware attackers to capitalize on
growing fear sweeping the globe.247 In the beginning of March, healthcare
systems have been targeted by a new and dangerous Windows ransomware
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threat.248 The threat is called “NetWalker,” and it is used by cybercrime groups
that have created phishing attacks against the healthcare sector during the early
stages of COVID-19.249 NetWalker lures its targets in with an email about
COVID-19,250 then attacks by locking down the computer or specific
websites.251 The Champaign Urbana Public Health District (“CHUPD”) in
Illinois, which covers 210,000 citizens and the University of Illinois, was
attacked by NetWalker in early March 2020.252 The malware attacked CHUPD’s
primary website, and forced the district to set up an alternate website to keep
citizens updated about the growing COVID-19 pandemic.253
Additionally, ransomware attackers have targeted systems abroad, such as
Hammersmith Medicines Research, a London-based company that conducts
medicinal clinical trials.254 While the company was in talks about testing a
potential COVID-19 vaccine, hackers locked thousands of patient records and
threatened to publish the information if a ransom was not paid.255 André Pienaar,
founder of venture capital firm C5 Capital, stated that cybersecurity companies
have seen “a number of instances where clinical labs involved in testing, or
major hospitals, have suffered ransomware attacks, where all their IT systems
have been knocked down.”256 Ransomware attackers have been attempting to
seek profits from the global crisis, and the ramifications could be devastating.257
Malcolm Taylor, head of cybersecurity at ITC Secure, said, “the attackers
know that these organizations are so desperate at the moment to build
ventilators, or to stop people from getting sick, and they are trying to exploit
that.”258 Furthermore, organizations have turned to a remote workforce, creating
an opportunity for ransomware attackers to target gateway and virtual private
network appliances.259 Now more than ever, cybersecurity officials have
recommended that hospitals regularly update their technology services,
strengthen protocols in response to breaches, and engage with security
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professionals on a more regular basis.260
In response to the growing cyberthreat, CISA issued an alert that
organizations keep all technology systems up to date and remain transparent
with employees about the dangers of ransomware.261 Since January 2020, more
than 4,000 coronavirus-themed web domains have emerged. Cyber group Check
Point estimates that “5 percent [of the web domains] were suspicious and 3
percent were malicious.”262 The repeated message from CISA to all
organizations is to ensure all employees are educated about the potential threats
that may appear as a result of the pandemic.263 Cyber experts have stated that
although USTelecom has pledged to protect against network vulnerabilities, it is
imperative that Congress provides greater funding to CISA and to the
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.264
IX. CONCLUSION
There is more that can be done in response to ransomware in the US. A
response to the growing threat must be through jurisprudential, political, and
financial means. The number of ever-increasing attacks can be impeded through
criminal deterrence,265 US cybercriminal tribunals,266 a local government focus
on cybercrime,267 and an increase in federal funding for CISA.268 To keep the
US and its citizens safe, the federal government, in conjunction with state
legislatures, must put its full force behind cybersecurity management.
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